Bravo two zero Page 4

  "We would be limited as to the amount of fuel we could take with us,"

  Dinger said, puffing on his cigarette, "and besides, the possibilities for concealment in the area around the MSR look bugger all."

  Since our mission required us to stay in the same area for a long time, our best form of defense was going to be concealment, and vehicles wouldn't help us with that at all. In this territory they'd stick out like a dog's bollocks. Every time we went on patrol we'd have to leave people with the wagons to keep them secure. Otherwise we wouldn't know if they'd been booby-trapped or we were walking into an ambush, or if they had been discovered by the local population and knowledge of their existence passed on. What was more, for eight men we would need two vehicles, and two vehicles equaled two chances of compromise. With one patrol on foot, there was only one chance of getting discovered. On the other hand, it might just be that two weeks' supply of ordnance and other equipment would be too much for us to carry, and despite their shortcomings we would have to go in vehicles -after all. We'd have to work out the equipment requirements first and take it from there.

  We worked out that we would need explosives and" ammunition, two weeks' worth of food and water per man, NBC clothing, and, only if there was room, personal kit. Vince did the calculations and reckoned that we could just about lug the lot ourselves.

  "So we're going to patrol on foot," he said. "But do we get people to take us in vehicles, or are we going to get a heli and patrol in?"

  "More chance of compromise in vehicles," Mark said. "We might not even get there without a resupply of fuel."

  "If we need a resupply by heli, why not just fly in anyway?" Legs said.

  In the end the team consensus was for a heli drop off.

  "Can we get an aircraft?" I asked Bert.

  He went to the operations room to check it out.

  I looked at the map. It must have been going through all of our minds how isolated we'd be. If we got into trouble, there'd be nobody up there to bail us out.

  Bob said, "At least if we're in the shit we don't have too many hills to hump over to get away."

  "Mmm, good one," Dinger grunted.

  Bert reappeared. "We can get you an aircraft, no problems."

  I opened the next debate. "Where should they drop us off then?"

  The good news about helicopters is that they get you there quickly. The bad news is that they do it noisily and can draw antiaircraft fire. The landing, too, is quite compromising. We didn't want it to be associated with the task, so we would want to choose a site that was at least 12 miles from the MSR itself. We wouldn't want to be landed east or west of the bend in the MSR because it would be harder to navigate to.

  Navigation is not a science but a skill. Why make the skill harder by putting in problems? The object was to reach the LUP (lying-up point) as quickly as we could.

  "Should we fly north over the MSR and then tab back south, or should we approach it from the south?" I said.

  Nobody saw any advantage in crossing the MSR with the aircraft, so we chose to be dropped due south of our chosen point. Then all we had to do was navigate due north and we'd hit the MSR.

  We would march on a bearing and measure distance by dead reckoning.

  Everybody knows his own pacing, and it's common practice to keep tally with a knotted length of para cord in your pocket. I knew, for example, that 112 of my paces on even ground equaled 325 feet. I would put ten knots in a length of para cord and feed it through a hole in my pocket.

  For every 112 paces I marched, I would pull one knot through. When I'd pulled ten knots through, I would know that I'd covered six-tenths of a mile, at which point I would check with the "check pacer." If his distance was different from mine, we'd take the average. This would be done in conjunction with Magellan, a handheld satellite navigation system. Sat Nav is an aid but it cannot be relied upon. It can go wrong and batteries can run out.

  We couldn't yet work out when we would want to be dropped off; we would do the time and distance evaluation later, depending on what the pilots said. It was up to them to gauge the problem of antiaircraft emplacements and troop concentrations, together with the problem of fitting us into a slot that didn't conflict with the hundreds of other sorties being flown every day-a factor known as deconfliction.

  By this stage of the planning we knew where we were going, how we were getting there, and more or less where we would like to get dropped off.

  There was a knock at the door.

  "We've got the pilot here if you want to talk with him," said a spook.

  The squadron leader was shorter than Mike, with ginger hair and freckles.

  "Could you get us to this point?" I asked, showing him the map.

  "When?" he asked in a flat Midlands monotone.

  "I don't know yet. Some time after two days."

  "At the moment, yes. However, I'd have to do my planning on deconfliction, etcetera. How many of you?"

  "Eight."

  "Vehicles?"

  "Just equipment."

  "No problem."

  I sensed that in his mind he was already calculating fuel loads, visualizing ground contours, thinking about antiaircraft capabilities.

  "Have you got any other information-as in maps?"

  "I was going to ask you the same question," I said.

  "No, we've got jack shit. If we can't get you there, where else do you want to go?"

  "All depends where you can get us to."

  The pilot would run the whole show from pickup to drop-off, even though he'd have no idea what the task was. We would trust his judgment totally; we would just be passengers.

  He left and we organized another brew before we tackled the tricky bit: how to attack the landlines and Scud.

  We wanted to work out how to inflict the maximum amount of damage with the minimum of effort. With luck, the cables would run alongside the MSR, and every 5 miles or so there would be inspection manholes. We didn't know if we would find a signal booster system inside the manholes, or what. But Stan suggested that because of the economics of laying lines, there might even be a land communication line inside as a bonus.

  More questions for Bert. Would the manhole covers be padlocked? Would they have intruder devices, and if so would we be able to defeat them?

  If not, would we have to start digging for the landline itself? Might they be encased in concrete or steel or other protective devices? If so, we might have to make a shaped charge to pierce the steel. Would the manholes be flooded to prevent attack? Strangely enough, this would actually be an advantage, because water acts as a tamping for explosives and would therefore increase the force of the explosion.

  We worked out that, depending on the ground, we'd do an array of four, five, or six cuts along the cable, and each one of them would be timed to detonate at different times over a period of days. We'd lay all the charges in one night, and have one going off, say, in the early evening next day. That would give one whole night when, at best, it was incapable of being repaired, or at least they would be slowed down, and they'd come probably at first light to fix it. They'd eventually find out where the cuts had been made and send a team down to repair them. It made sense for us to try and include these people in the damage if we could, thereby reducing the Iraqis' capability to carry out other repairs. Mark came up with the idea of putting down Elsie mines, which are small antipersonnel mines that work on pressure. When you step on them, they explode.

  If everything went to plan, the first charge would make the cut and when they came down, possibly at first light, to repair it, the technician or a guard would lose his foot to an Elsie mine. The next evening, number two would go off, but we'd have laid the charge without Elsie mines.

  However, the boys that came down would be very wary, take their time, or maybe even refuse to do the job. The following day, another would go off, and this time we would have laid Elsie mines. Maybe they'd be more confident, and they'd get hit again. The only problem would be that we couldn't plac
e the Elsie mines too near the site we were blowing, or the explosion might dislodge or expose them.

  In the worst scenario, we'd have rendered the cable inoperable over six days. At best, we might have wrecked it for ever after the first day.

  It was a brilliant thought of Mark's, and we added two boxes of Elsies -twenty-four in all-to the equipment list.

  In essence, we would do as many cuts as we could with the ordnance and time available. It might be that we'd have to do cuts that were 12 miles apart, and take two nights doing it. I hoped we wouldn't have to blow the manholes to get at the cables, because if they checked other covers they'd be sure to find the other devices. To cater for that, we would put an anti handling device on all the timers. It would either be a pull switch or a pressure release, which would detonate the charge if they lifted it.

  I was starting to feel tired. It was time for a break, or we'd begin to make mistakes. You only rush your planning if you have to.

  We had a brew and stretched our legs before getting down to the business of how to destroy Scud.

  Thirty-seven feet long and about 3 feet wide, the Russian-built SS-1C Scud-B had a range of 100-175 miles. It was transported on, and fired from, an eight wheeled TEL (transporter erector launcher). Crews were trained to operate from points of maximum concealment. Not very accurate, Scud was designed to strike at major storage sites, marshaling areas, and airfields, and was almost more of a propaganda weapon. As well as conventional high explosive, it could carry chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads.

  When our armored divisions were sent to Saudi, a rumor had circulated that if Saddam Hussein used chemicals against British forces, Mrs.

  Thatcher had instructed the generals to go tactical nuclear. I never thought that in my lifetime I'd find myself up against chemical agents.

  No one in their right mind would use them, but here was a man who had done so against Iran and his own people and would no doubt do so again in this war if the need arose.

  "There are maybe fifteen to twenty TELs but many more missiles," Bert said. "You can expect the TEL to be accompanied by a command vehicle, like a Land Cruiser, with the commander and/or the surveyor aboard. In the TEL itself will be the crew, two in the front, and other operators in the back. The command post within the TEL itself is in the center of the vehicle, entry being via a door on the left-hand side. There might be infantry in support, but we don't know how many-nor whether there might be several TELs together in convoy, or operating individually."

  It became clear that the surveyor was the main personality at a Scud launch. After the transporter rumbled up to an unprepared site, there was a wait of about an hour before the Scud could be launched. The time was spent in accurate site surveying, radar tracking of upper atmosphere balloons, calculating such factors as angle of deflection, and pumping in of propellants. There were a couple of lesser players, too-the commander, and the operators in the control center who tapped in the coordinates. That made a minimum of three people to be killed in order to render the launcher totally inoperable. However, they could be replaced. We'd still have to deal with the Scud.

  How would we destroy it? Air strikes are all very well, but we knew that the Iraqis had excellent DF (direction finding) capability, and we had to assume the worst scenario-that their DF equipment was intact and operational. It worked via a series of listening posts dotted around the country that shot a bearing out to the source of a radio signal. It only took two such bearings to pinpoint a position; it would then be very easy for them to get hold of us, especially if we were on foot.

  Calling in an air strike would effectively mean that we had gone overt.

  We'd only use air strikes if the Iraqis made us an offer we couldn't refuse-say, the world's supply of Scuds in convoy. Then we'd just have to get on the net (radio network) and take a chance of getting DF'd. We had to assume that they'd know we were there anyway just because the strike had been directed in.

  If we were going to attack the missile itself, there were dangers with the warhead. We wouldn't know if it was chemical, biological, nuclear, or conventional, and we didn't want to have to take the precaution of attacking with NEC protective clothing on because it takes time to put on and slows you down badly. The fuel was also a problem, being highly noxious.

  The TEL itself would be a better target, because without it the rockets couldn't be launched.

  "Can we destroy it?" Bob said.

  "Probably, but we don't know how easy it would be to repair," Dinger said. "And anyway, it's too near the missile."

  "What about the flight information that has to be installed into the rockets?" Chris said.

  The more we thought about it, the more sense it made to do a hands-on attack to destroy the control center in the middle of the vehicle.

  "We could just put a charge in there which would fuck things up nice without any problems to us," Vince suggested. "The TEL must be protected against the rocket blast-enough to stop our charge affecting the missile."

  We knew what to attack, but how would we do it? We finally decided that when we saw a Scud being launched, which shouldn't be too difficult given the billiard-table terrain, we would take a bearing and find it.

  Hopefully if the landlines were destroyed there would not be any launches anyway.

  We knew the vulnerable points. We knew there would be no problems, finding the Scuds. We would go to the area, pinpoint the launch site, and put in a CTR (close target recce) to find out how many troops there were, how many launchers were left, and where the stags were. In a typical CTR, we'd probably find the Scud, then move back and stop at an FRY (final RV) about a mile away, depending on the ground. From there, four blokes would go and carry out a 360degree recce of the position itself, looking for vulnerable points.

  Two of us would then go in as far as we had to in order to complete the information. Then we'd withdraw to the FRY. I'd have to give a quick brief for that CTR-how we were going to do it, how we were going to get there, what direction we were going to come back in, what the recognition signal was as we came back into the FRY. You always come back in exactly the same direction you left from, to cut down confusion.

  My normal recognition signal was to walk in with both arms outstretched in a crucifix position, my weapon in my right hand. Different patrols use different signs. The aim is to cut out the noise of a challenge and be easily ID'd. FRVs have to be somewhere easily identifiable and defendable, because navigating back to them in pitch darkness is not as easy as it sounds. Back at the FRY, I'd mentally prepare a quick set of orders for the attack and then tell everybody what was "on target."

  Until we actually got on the ground, we would work on the assumption that we'd have at least three "points of contact": i.e." we'd kill the surveyor, control-center commander, and operators. This would normally be done with silenced weapons. A man will always drop if you put a round into his body T-the imaginary line from one temple running across the eyebrows to the other temple and from that line down the center of the face from the bridge of the nose to the base of the sternum. Pop in a round anywhere along the T, and your man will always go down. It must be done from close up, almost right on top of him. You go from a "rolling start line" and just keep going until he turns round; then you must be quick. You cannot hesitate. It's all down to pure speed, aggression, and surprise.

  So much for the theory. Vince had brought a silenced weapon with him from the UK, but another squadron had come and begged it off him for a specific task and there were none left. D Squadron had got to Saudi before us, and down at the stores there had been a nasty outbreak of Shiny Kit Syndrome. They had snaffled everything in sight, and there was no point in us going and asking them nicely if we could please have our ball back. They'd only say they needed it-and probably they did. In the absence of silenced weapons we'd probably have to use our fighting knives-weapons resembling the famous Second World War commando dagger-if we wanted the attack to remain covert for as long as possible.

  A fire-suppo
rt base consisting of four men would be positioned, and then the other four would move out and infiltrate the Scud area. We'd take out the surveyor, then the characters sleeping or sitting in the TEL.

  Then we'd lay a charge made from PE4 plastic explosive. My guess was that about 2 pounds of explosive on a 2-hour timer inside the TEL would do the trick. We'd close the door and up it would go, well after we'd ex filtrated We'd put an anti handling device on the PEas well, so that even if they found it and went to lift it, it would detonate.

  Also on the charge we would have a compromise device. This would be a grip switch that would initiate a length of safety fuse, which in turn would initiate the detonator after about 60 seconds. So if the shit hit the fan, we could just place the charge and run. There would be three different initiations on the charges, hopefully covering any eventuality: the timing device, an anti handling device-pull, pressure, or pressure release, whichever was appropriate-and a compromise device.

  It was 1600. One or two of the faces around me were beginning to look tired, and I guessed that I looked the same. We'd really motored. We knew how we were going to do the task, even down to such detail as "actions on." Actions on contact for the 4-man fire-support group were to give covering fire to allow the attack group, if possible, to complete their task and extract themselves. Actions on for the 4-man attack group were to give support to each other and attempt to complete the target attack using the compromise device. One way or another, they should extract to the ERV (emergency RV) and quickly regroup. They should then move to the patrol RV and regroup with the fire support team.

  We wouldn't know, of course, if any of this was feasible until we saw the disposition on the ground. There might be four TELs together, which would pose problems of compromise as there would be many more targets.